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Abstract
Sequential querying of differentially private mechanisms degrades the overall privacy level.
In this paper, we answer the fundamental question of characterizing the level of overall privacy
degradation as a function of the number of queries and the privacy levels maintained by each
privatization mechanism. Our solution is complete: we prove an upper bound on the overall
privacy level and construct a sequence of privatization mechanisms that achieves this bound.
The key innovation is the introduction of an operational interpretation of differential privacy
(involving hypothesis testing) and the use of new data processing inequalities. Our result im-
proves over the state-of-the-art, and has immediate applications in several problems studied in
the literature including differentially private multi-party computation.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy is a formal framework to quantify to what extent individual privacy in a sta-
tistical database is preserved while releasing useful aggregate information about the database. It
provides strong privacy guarantees by requiring the indistinguishability of whether an individual is
in the database or not based on the released information, regardless of the side information on the
other aspects of the database the adversary may possess. Denoting the database when the individ-
ual is present as D and as D′ when the individual is not, a differentially private mechanism provides
indistinguishability guarantees with respect to the pair (D,D′). More generally, we consider pairs
of databases that indistinguishability is guaranteed for as “neighbors”. The formal definition of
(, δ)-differential privacy is the following.
Definition 1.1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06, DKM+06a]). A randomized mechanism M over a
set of databases is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for all pairs of neighboring databases D and D′,
and for all sets S in the output space of the mechanism X ,
P(M(D) ∈ S) ≤ eε P(M(D′) ∈ S) + δ .
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A basic problem in differential privacy is how privacy of a fixed pair of neighbors (D,D′)
degrades under composition of interactive queries when each query, individually, meets certain
differential privacy guarantees. A routine argument shows that the composition of k queries, each
of which is (, δ)-differentially private, is at least (k, kδ)-differentially private [DMNS06, DKM+06a,
DL09, DRV10]. A tighter bound of (ε˜δ˜, kδ+δ˜)-differential privacy under k-fold adaptive composition
is provided, using more sophisticated arguments, in [DRV10] for the case when each of the individual
queries is (, δ)-differentially private. Here ε˜δ˜ = O
(
kε2 + ε
√
k log(1/δ˜)
)
. On the other hand, it was
not known if this bound could be improved until this work.
Our main result is the exact characterization of the privacy guarantee under k-fold compo-
sition. Any k-fold adaptive composition of (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms satisfies this
privacy guarantee, stated as Theorem 3.3. Further, we demonstrate a specific sequence of privacy
mechanisms which under (in fact, nonadaptive) composition actually degrade privacy to the level
guaranteed. Our result entails a strict improvement over the state-of-the-art: this can be seen
immediately in the following approximation – using the same notation as above, the value of ε˜δ˜ is
now reduced to ε˜δ˜ = O
(
kε2 + ε
√
k log(e+ (ε
√
k/δ˜) )
)
. Since a typical choice of δ˜ is δ˜ = Θ(kδ), in
the regime where ε = Θ(
√
kδ), this improves the existing guarantee by a logarithmic factor. The
gain is especially significant when both ε and δ are small.
We start with the view of differential privacy as providing certain guarantees for the two error
types (false alarm and missed detection) in a binary hypothesis testing problem (involving two
neighboring databases), as in previous work [WZ10]. We brings two benefits of this operational
interpretation of the privacy definition to bear on the problem at hand.
• The first is conceptual: the operational setting directs the logic of the steps of the proof,
makes the arguments straightforward and readily allows generalizations such as heterogeneous
compositions.
• The second is technical: the operational interpretation of hypothesis testing brings both the
natural data processing inequality, and the strong converse to the data processing inequality.
These inequalities, while simple by themselves, lead to surprisingly strong technical results.
As an aside, we mention that there is a strong tradition of such derivations in the information
theory literature: the Fisher information inequality [Bla65, Zam98], the entropy power in-
equality [Sta59, Bla65, VG06], an extremal inequality involving mutual informations [LV07],
matrix determinant inequalities [CT88], the Brunn-Minkowski inequality and its functional
analytic variants [DCT91] – Chapter 17 of [CT12] enumerates a detailed list – were all derived
using operational interpretations of mutual information and corresponding data processing
inequalities.
One special case of our results, the strengthening of the state-of-the-art result in [DRV10],
could also have been arrived at directly by using stronger technical methods than used in [DRV10].
Specifically, we use a direct expression for the privacy region (instead of an upper bound) to arrive
at our strengthened result.
The optimal composition theorem (Theorem 3.3) provides a fundamental limit on how much
privacy degrades under composition. Such a characterization is a basic result in differential privacy
and has been used widely in the literature [DRV10, HLM10, BBDS12, GRU12, MN12, HR13]. In
each of these instances, the optimal composition theorem derived here (or the simpler character-
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ization of Theorem 3.4) could be “cut-and-pasted”, allowing for corresponding strengthening of
their conclusions. We demonstrate this strengthening for two instances: variance of noise adding
mechanisms in Section 4.1 and [BBDS12] in Appendix C.1. We further show that a variety of exist-
ing noise adding mechanisms ensure the same level of privacy with similar variances. This implies
that there is nothing special about the popular choice of adding a Gaussian noise when composing
multiple queries, and the same utility as measured through the noise variance can be obtained using
other known mechanisms. As an application to the operational definition of differential privacy,
we prove, in Section 5, that a simple non-interactive randomize response mechanism is optimal in
secure multi-party computation. We start our discussions by operationally introducing differential
privacy as certain guarantees on the error probabilities in a binary hypothesis testing problem.
2 Differential Privacy as Hypothesis Testing
Given a random output Y of a database access mechanism M , consider the following hypothesis
testing experiment. We choose a null hypothesis as database D0 and alternative hypothesis as D1:
H0 : Y came from a database D0 ,
H1 : Y came from a database D1 .
For a choice of a rejection region S, the probability of false alarm (type I error), when the null
hypothesis is true but rejected, is defined as PFA(D0, D1,M, S) ≡ P
(
M(D0) ∈ S
)
, and the proba-
bility of missed detection (type II error), when the null hypothesis is false but retained, is defined
as PMD(D0, D1,M, S) ≡ P
(
M(D1) ∈ S¯
)
where S¯ is the complement of S. The differential privacy
condition on a mechanism M is equivalent to the following set of constraints on the probability of
false alarm and missed detection. Wasserman and Zhu proved that (ε, 0)-differential privacy implies
the conditions (1) for a special case when δ = 0 [WZ10, Theorem 2.4]. The same proof technique
can be used to prove a similar result for general δ ∈ [0, 1], and to prove that the conditions (1)
imply (ε, δ)-differential privacy as well. We refer to Section 9.2 for a proof.
Theorem 2.1. For any ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], a database mechanism M is (ε, δ)-differentially private
if and only if the following conditions are satisfied for all pairs of neighboring databases D0 and
D1, and all rejection region S ⊆ X :
PFA(D0, D1,M, S) + e
εPMD(D0, D1,M, S) ≥ 1− δ , and (1)
eεPFA(D0, D1,M, S) + PMD(D0, D1,M, S) ≥ 1− δ .
This operational perspective of differential privacy relates the privacy parameters ε and δ to a
set of conditions on probability of false alarm and missed detection. This shows that it is impossible
to get both small PMD and PFA from data obtained via a differentially private mechanism, and that
the converse is also true. This operational interpretation of differential privacy suggests a graphical
representation of differential privacy as illustrated in Figure 1. We define the privacy region for
(ε, δ)-differential privacy as
R(ε, δ) ≡ {(PMD, PFA) ∣∣PFA + eεPMD ≥ 1− δ , and eεPFA + PMD ≥ 1− δ} . (2)
Similarly, we define the privacy region of a database access mechanism M with respect to two
neighboring databases D and D′ as
R(M,D,D′) ≡ conv
({
(PMD(D,D
′,M, S), PFA(D,D′,M, S))
∣∣ for all S ⊆ X}) , (3)
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Figure 1: Privacy region for (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Dotted line represents the solution of a
maximization problem (28). For simplicity, we only show the privacy region below the line PFA +
PMD ≤ 1, since the whole region is symmetric w.r.t. the line PFA + PMD = 1.
where conv(·) is the convex hull of a set. Operationally, by taking the convex hull, the region
includes the pairs of false alarm and missed detection probabilities achieved by soft decisions that
might use internal randomness in the hypothesis testing. Precisely, let γ : X → {H0, H1} be any
decision rule where we allow probabilistic decisions. For example, if the output is in a set S1 we
can accept the null hypothesis with a certain probability p1, and for another set S2 accept with
probability p2. In full generality, a decision rule γ can be fully described by a partition {Si} of the
output space X , and corresponding accept probabilities {pi}. The probabilities of false alarm and
missed detection for a decision rule γ is defined as PFA(D0, D1,M, γ) ≡ P(γ(M(D0)) = H1) and
PMD(D0, D1,M, γ) ≡ P(γ(M(D1)) = H0).
Remark 2.2. For all neighboring databases D and D′, and a database access mechanism M , the
pair of a false alarm and a missed detection probabilities achieved by any decision rule γ is included
in the privacy region:
(PMD(D,D
′,M, γ), PFA(D,D′,M, γ)) ∈ R(M,D,D′) ,
for all decision rule γ.
Let D ∼ D′ denote that the two databases are neighbors. The union over all neighboring
databases define the privacy region of the mechanism.
R(M) ≡
⋃
D∼D′
R(M,D,D′) .
The following corollary, which follows immediately from Theorem 2.1, gives a necessary and suffi-
cient condition on the privacy region for (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Corollary 2.3. A mechanism M is (ε, δ)-differentially private if and only if R(M) ⊆ R(ε, δ).
To illustrate the strengths of the graphical representation of differential privacy, we provide
simpler proofs for some well-known results in differential privacy in Appendix A.
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Consider two database access mechanisms M(·) and M ′(·). Let X and Y denote the random
outputs of mechanisms M and M ′ respectively. We say M dominates M ′ if M ′(D) is conditionally
independent of the database D conditioned on the outcome of M(D). In other words, the database
D, X = M(D) and Y = M ′(D) form the following Markov chain: D–X–Y .
Theorem 2.4 (Data processing inequality for differential privacy). If a mechanism M dominates
a mechanism M ′, then for all pairs of neighboring databases D1 and D2,
R(M ′, D1, D2) ⊆ R(M,D1, D2) .
We provide a proof in Section 9.1. Wasserman and Zhu [WZ10, Lemma 2.6] have proved that,
for a special case when M is (ε, 0)-differentially private, M ′ is also (ε, 0)-differentially private, which
is a corollary of the above theorem. Perhaps surprisingly, the converse is also true.
Theorem 2.5 ([Bla53, Corollary of Theorem 10]). Fix a pair of neighboring databases D1 and D2
and let X and Y denote the random outputs of mechanisms M and M ′, respectively. If M and M ′
satisfy
R(M ′, D1, D2) ⊆ R(M,D1, D2) ,
then there exists a coupling of the random outputs X and Y such that they form a Markov chain
D–X–Y where D ∈ {D1, D2}.
When the privacy region of M ′ is included in M , then there exists a stochastic transformation
T that operates on X and produce a random output that has the same marginal distribution as Y
conditioned on the database D. We can consider this mechanism T as a privatization mechanism
that takes a (privatized) output X and provides even further privatization. The above theorem was
proved in [Bla53, Corollary of Theorem 10] in the context of comparing two experiments, where a
statistical experiment denotes a mechanism in the context of differential privacy.
3 Composition of Differentially Private Mechanisms
In this section, we address how differential privacy guarantees compose: when accessing databases
multiple times via differentially private mechanisms, each of which having its own privacy guar-
antees, how much privacy is still guaranteed on the union of those outputs? To formally define
composition, we consider the following scenario known as the ‘composition experiment’, proposed
in [DRV10].
A composition experiment takes as input a parameter b ∈ {0, 1}, and an adversary A. From
the hypothesis testing perspective proposed in the previous section, b can be interpreted as the
hypothesis: null hypothesis for b = 0 and alternative hypothesis for b = 1. At each time i, a
database Di,b is accessed depending on b. For example, one includes a particular individual and
another does not. An adversary A is trying to break privacy (and figure out whether the particular
individual is in the database or not) by testing the hypotheses on the output of k sequential access
to those databases via differentially private mechanisms. In full generality, we allow the adversary
to have full control over which pair of databases to access, which query to ask, and which mechanism
to be used at each repeated access. Further, the adversary is free to make these choices adaptively
based on the previous outcomes. The only restrictions are the differentially private mechanisms
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belong to a family M (e.g., the family of all (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms), the internal
randomness of the mechanisms are independent at each repeated access, and that the hypothesis b
is not known to the adversary.
Compose(A,M, k, b)
Input: A, M, k, b
Output: V b
for i = 1 to k do
A requests (Di,0, Di,1, qi,Mi) for some Mi ∈M;
A receives yi = Mi(Di,b, qi);
end for
Output the view of the adversary V b = (Rb, Y b1 , . . . , Y
b
k ).
The outcome of this k-fold composition experiment is the view of the adversary A: V b ≡
(R, Y b1 , . . . , Y
b
k ), which is the sequence of random outcomes Y
b
1 , . . . , Y
b
k , and the outcome R of any
internal randomness of A.
3.1 Optimal privacy region under composition
In terms of testing whether a particular individual is in the database (b = 0) or not (b = 1), we want
to characterize how much privacy degrades after a k-fold composition experiment. It is known that
the privacy degrades under composition by at most the ‘sum’ of the differential privacy parameters
of each access.
Theorem 3.1 ([DMNS06, DKM+06a, DL09, DRV10]). For any ε > 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], the class
of (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms satisfy (kε, kδ)-differential privacy under k-fold adaptive
composition.
In general, one can show that if Mi is (εi, δi)-differentially private, then the composition satisfies
(
∑
i∈[k] εi,
∑
i∈[k] δi)-differential privacy. If we do not allow any slack in the δ, this bound cannot
be tightened. Precisely, there are examples of mechanisms which under k-fold composition violate
(ε,
∑
i∈[k] δi)-differential privacy for any ε <
∑
i∈[k] εi. We can prove this by providing a set S
such that the privacy condition is met with equality: P(V 0 ∈ S) = e
∑
i∈[k] εiP(V 1 ∈ S) +∑i∈[k] δi.
However, if we allow for a slightly larger value of δ, then Dwork et al. showed in [DRV10] that one
can gain a significantly higher privacy guarantee in terms of ε.
Theorem 3.2 ([DRV10, Theorem III.3]). For any ε > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], and δ˜ ∈ (0, 1], the class of
(ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms satisfies (ε˜δ˜, kδ+δ˜)-differential privacy under k-fold adaptive
composition, for
ε˜δ˜ = kε(e
ε − 1) + ε
√
2k log(1/δ˜). (4)
By allowing a slack of δ˜ > 0, one can get a higher privacy of ε˜δ˜ = O(kε
2 +
√
kε2), which is
significantly smaller than kε. This is the best known guarantee so far, and has been used whenever
one requires a privacy guarantee under composition (e.g. [DRV10, BBDS12, HR13]). However, the
important question of optimality has remained open. Namely, is there a composition of mechanisms
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where the above privacy guarantee is tight? In other words, is it possible to get a tighter bound on
differential privacy under composition?
We give a complete answer to this fundamental question in the following theorems. We prove
a tighter bound on the privacy under composition. Further, we also prove the achievability of
the privacy guarantee: we provide a set of mechanisms such that the privacy region under k-fold
composition is exactly the region defined by the conditions in (5). Hence, this bound on the privacy
region is tight and cannot be improved upon.
Theorem 3.3. For any ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], the class of (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms
satisfies (
(k − 2i)ε , 1− (1− δ)k(1− δi)
)
-differential privacy (5)
under k-fold adaptive composition, for all i = {0, 1, . . . , bk/2c}, where
δi =
∑i−1
`=0
(
k
`
)(
e(k−`)ε − e(k−2i+`)ε)
(1 + eε)k
. (6)
Hence, the privacy region of k-fold composition is an intersection of k regions, each of which is
((k − 2i)ε, 1 − (1 − δ)k(1 − δi))-differentially private: R({(k − 2i)ε, 1 − (1 − δ)k(1 − δi)}i∈[k/2]) ≡⋂b k
2
c
i=0R((k − 2i)ε, 1 − (1 − δ)k(1 − δi)). We give a proof in Section 6 where we give an explicit
mechanism that achieves this region under composition. Hence, this bound on the privacy region is
tight, and gives the exact description of how much privacy can degrade under k-fold adaptive com-
position. This settles the question left open in [DMNS06, DKM+06a, DL09, DRV10] by providing,
for the first time, the fundamental limit of composition, and proving a matching mechanism with
the worst-case privacy degradation.
To prove the optimality of our main result in Theorem 3.3, namely that it is impossible to have
a privacy worse than (5), we rely on the operational interpretation of the privacy as hypothesis
testing. To this end, we use the new analysis tools (Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 2.5) provided in
the previous section. Figure 2 illustrates how much the privacy region of Theorem 3.3 degrades
as we increase the number of composition k. Figure 3 provides a comparison of the three privacy
guarantees in Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 for 30-fold composition of (0.1, 0.001)-differentially private
mechanisms. Smaller region gives a tighter bound, since it guarantees the higher privacy.
3.2 Simplified privacy region under composition
In many applications of the composition theorems, a closed form expression of the composition
privacy guarantee is required. The privacy guarantee in (5) is tight, but can be difficult to eval-
uate. The next theorem provides a simpler form expression which is an outer bound of the exact
region described in (5). Comparing to (4), the privacy guarantee is significantly improved from
ε˜δ˜ = O
(
kε2 +
√
kε2 log(1/δ˜)
)
to ε˜δ˜ = O
(
kε2 + min
{√
kε2 log(1/δ˜), ε log(ε/δ˜)
})
, especially when
composing a large number k of interactive queries. Further, the δ-approximate differential privacy
degradation of (1− (1− δ)k(1− δ˜)) is also strictly smaller than the previous (kδ + δ˜). We discuss
the significance of this improvement in the next section using examples from existing differential
privacy literature.
7
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.5  1
k=1
k=2
k=3
k=4
k=5
PFA
PMD
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.5  1
k=1
k=2
k=3
k=4
k=5
PFA
PMD
Figure 2: Privacy region R({(k − 2i)ε, δi}) for the class of (ε, 0)-differentially private mechanisms
(left) and (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms (right) under k-fold adaptive composition.
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.5  1
Theorem 3.1
Theorem 3.2
Theorem 3.3
PFA
PMD
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.5  1
privacy regionPFA
PMD
1− dε˜(P0, P1)↘
slope = −eε˜↙
Figure 3: Theorem 3.3 provides the tightest bound (left). Given a mechanism M , the privacy
region can be completely described by its boundary, which is represented by a set of tangent lines
of the form PFA = −eε˜PMD + 1− dε˜(P0, P1) (right).
Theorem 3.4. For any ε > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], and δ˜ ∈ [0, 1], the class of (ε, δ)-differentially private
mechanisms satisfies
(
ε˜δ˜, 1− (1−δ)k(1− δ˜)
)
-differential privacy under k-fold adaptive composition,
for
ε˜δ˜ = min
 kε , (eε − 1)εkeε + 1 + ε
√
2k log
(
e+
√
kε2
δ˜
)
,
(eε − 1)εk
eε + 1
+ ε
√
2k log
(1
δ˜
) . (7)
In the high privacy regime, where ε ≤ 0.9, this bound can be further simplified as
ε˜δ˜ ≤ min
{
kε, kε2 + ε
√
2k log
(
e+ (
√
kε2/δ˜ )
)
, kε2 + ε
√
2k log(1/δ˜)
}
.
A proof is provided in Section 7. This privacy guarantee improves over the existing result of The-
orem 3.2 when δ˜ = Θ(
√
kε2). Typical regime of interest is the high-privacy regime for composition
privacy guarantee, i.e. when
√
kε2  1. The above theorem suggests that we only need the extra
slack of approximate privacy δ˜ of order
√
kε2.
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3.3 Composition Theorem for Heterogeneous Mechanisms
We considered homogeneous mechanisms, where all mechanisms are (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Our analysis readily extends to heterogeneous mechanisms, where the `-th query satisfies (ε`, δ`)-
differential privacy (we refer to such mechanisms as (ε`, δ`)-differentially private mechanisms).
Theorem 3.5. For any ε` > 0, δ` ∈ [0, 1] for ` ∈ {1, . . . . , k}, and δ˜ ∈ [0, 1], the class of (ε`, δ`)-
differentially private mechanisms satisfy
(
ε˜δ˜, 1 − (1 − δ˜)
∏k
`=1(1 − δ`)
)
-differential privacy under
k-fold adaptive composition, for ε˜δ˜ =
min

k∑
`=1
ε` ,
k∑
`=1
(eε` − 1)ε`
eε` + 1
+
√√√√√ k∑
`=1
2 ε2` log
(
e+
√∑k
`=1 ε
2
`
δ˜
)
,
k∑
`=1
(eε` − 1)ε`
eε` + 1
+
√√√√ k∑
`=1
2 ε2` log
(1
δ˜
) . (8)
This tells us that the ε`’s sum up under composition: whenever we have kε or kε
2 in (7) we can
replace it by the summation to get the general result for heterogeneous case.
4 Applications of the Optimal Composition Theorem
When analyzing a complex mechanism with multiple sub-mechanisms each with (ε0, δ0)-differential
privacy guarantee, we can apply the composition theorem (Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.4). To en-
sure overall (ε, δ)-differential privacy for the whole complex mechanism, one chooses ε0 = ε/(2
√
k log(e+ ε/δ))
and δ0 = δ/2k, when there are k sub-mechanisms. The existing composition theorem guarantees
the desired overall privacy. Then, the utility of the complex mechanism is calculated for the choice
of ε0 and δ0.
Following this recipe, we first provide a sufficient condition on the variance of noise adding
mechanisms. This analysis shows that one requires smaller variance than what is previously be-
lieved, in the regime where ε = Θ(δ). Further, we show that a variety of known mechanisms achieve
the desired privacy under composition with the same level of variance. Applying this analysis to
known mechanisms for cut queries of a graph, we show that again in the regime where ε = Θ(δ),
one can achieve the desired privacy under composition with improved utility.
For count queries with sensitivity one, the geometric noise adding mechanism is known to be
universally optimal in a general cost minimization framework (Bayesian setting in [GRS12] and
worst-case setting in [GV12]). Here we provide a new interpretation of the geometric noise adding
mechanism as an optimal mechanism under composition for counting queries. In the course of
proving Theorem 3.3, we show that a family of mechanisms are optimal under composition, in
the sense that they achieve the largest privacy region among k-fold compositions of any (εi, δi)
differentially private mechanisms. Larger region under composition implies that one can achieve
smaller error rates, while ensuring the same level of privacy at each step of the composition. In
this section, we show that the geometric mechanism is one of such mechanisms, thus providing the
new interpretation to the optimality of the geometric mechanisms.
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4.1 Variance of noise adding mechanisms under composition
In this section, we consider real-valued queries q : D → R. The sensitivity of a real-valued query is
defined as the maximum absolute difference of the output between two neighboring databases:
∆ ≡ max
D∼D′
|q(D)− q(D′)| ,
where ∼ indicates that the pair of databases are neighbors. A common approach to privatize such a
query output is to add noise to it, and the variance of the noise grows with sensitivity of the query
and the desired level of privacy. A popular choice of the noise is Gaussian. It is previously known
that it is sufficient to add Gaussian noise with variance O(k∆2 log(1/δ)/ε2) to each query output
in order to ensure (ε, δ)-differential privacy under k-fold composition. We improve the analysis of
Gaussians under composition, and show that for a certain regime where ε = Θ(δ), the sufficient
condition can be improved by a log factor.
When composing real-valued queries, the Gaussian mechanism is a popular choice [DN03, DN04,
BDMN05, BBDS12, HR13]. However, we show that there is nothing special about Gaussian mech-
anisms for composition. We prove that the Laplacian mechanism or the staircase mechanism intro-
duced in [GV12] can achieve the same level of privacy under composition with the same variance.
We can use Theorem 3.4 to find how much noise we need to add to each query output, in order
to ensure (ε, δ)-differential privacy under k-fold composition. We know that if each query output is
(ε0, δ0)-differentially private, then the composed outputs satisfy (kε
2
0+
√
2kε20 log(e+
√
kε20/δ˜), kδ0+
δ˜)-differential privacy assuming ε0 ≤ 0.9. With the choice of δ0 = δ/2k, δ˜ = δ/
√
2, and ε20 =
ε2/4k log(e+ (ε/δ)), this ensures that the target privacy of (ε, δ) is satisfied under k-fold composi-
tion as described in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. For any ε ∈ (0, 0.9] and δ ∈ (0, 1], if the database access mechanism satis-
fies (
√
ε2/4k log(e+ (ε/δ)), δ/2k)-differential privacy on each query output, then it satisfies (ε, δ)-
differential privacy under k-fold composition.
One of the most popular noise adding mechanisms is the Laplacian mechanism, which adds
Laplacian noise to real-valued query outputs. When the sensitivity is ∆, one can achieve (ε0, 0)-
differential privacy with the choice of the distribution Lap(ε0/∆) = (ε0/2∆)e
−ε0|x|/∆. The resulting
variance of the noise is 2∆2/ε20. The above corollary implies a certain sufficient condition on the
variance of the Laplacian mechanism to ensure privacy under composition.
Corollary 4.2. For real-valued queries with sensitivity ∆ > 0, the mechanism that adds Lapla-
cian noise with variance
(
8k∆2 log
(
e + (ε/δ)
)
/ε2
)
satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy under k-fold
adaptive composition for any ε ∈ (0, 0.9] and δ ∈ (0, 1].
In terms of variance-privacy trade-off for real-valued queries, the optimal noise-adding mecha-
nism known as the staircase mechanism was introduced in [GV12]. The probability density function
of this noise is piecewise constant, and the probability density on the pieces decay geometrically. It is
shown in [GV13] that that with variance of O(min{1/ε2, 1/δ2}), the staircase mechanism achieved
(ε, δ)-differential privacy. Corollary 4.1 implies that with variance O
(
k∆2 log(e + ε/δ)/ε2
)
, the
staircase mechanism satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy under k-fold composition.
Another popular mechanism known as the Gaussian mechanism privatizes each query output
by adding a Gaussian noise with variance σ2. It is not difficult to show that when the sensitivity
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of the query is ∆, with a choice of σ2 ≥ 2∆2 log(2/δ0)/ε20, the Gaussian mechanism satisfies
(ε0, δ0)-differential privacy (e.g. [DKM
+06a]). The above corollary implies that the Gaussian
mechanism with variance O(k∆2 log(1/δ) log(e+ (ε/δ))/ε2) ensures (ε, δ)-differential privacy under
k-fold composition. However, we can get a tighter sufficient condition by directly analyzing how
Gaussian mechanisms compose, and the proof is provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.3. For real-valued queries with sensitivity ∆ > 0, the mechanism that adds Gaus-
sian noise with variance
(
8k∆2 log
(
e + (ε/δ)
)
/ε2
)
satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy under k-fold
adaptive composition for any ε > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1].
It is previously known that it is sufficient to add i.i.d. Gaussian noise with varianceO(k∆2 log(1/δ)/ε2)
to ensure (ε, δ)-differential privacy under k-fold composition (e.g. [HT10, Theorem 2.7]). The above
theorem shows that when δ = Θ(ε), one can achieve the same privacy with smaller variance by a
factor of log(1/δ).
4.2 Geometric noise adding mechanism under composition
In this section, we consider integer valued queries q : D → Z with sensitivity one, also called
counting queries. Such queries are common in practice, e.g. “How many individuals have income
less than $100,000?”. Presence of absence of an individual record changes the output at most by
one. Counting query is a well-studied topic in differential privacy [DN03, DN04, BDMN05, BLR13]
and they provide a primitive for constructing more complex queries [BDMN05].
The geometric noise adding mechanism is a discrete variant of the popular Laplacian mechanism.
For integer-valued queries with sensitivity one, the mechanism adds a noise distributed according to
a double-sided geometric distribution whose probability density function is p(k) =
(
(eε − 1)/(eε +
1)
)
e−ε|k|. This mechanism is known to be universally optimal in a general cost minimization
framework (Bayesian setting in [GRS12] and worst-case setting in [GV12]). In this section, we
show that the geometric noise adding mechanism achieves the fundamental limit on the privacy
region under composition.
Consider the composition experiment for counting queries. For a pair of neighboring databases
D0 and D1, some of the query outputs differ by one, since sensitivity is one, and for other queries
the output might be the same. Let k denote the number of queries whose output differs with
respect to D0 and D1. Then, we show in Section C that the privacy region achieved by geometric
mechanism, that adds geometric noise for each integer-valued query output, is exactly described
by the optimal composition theorem of (5). Further, since this is the largest privacy region under
composition for the pair of database D0 and D1 that differ in k queries, no other mechanism can
achieve a larger privacy region. Since the geometric mechanism does not depend on the particular
choice of pairs of databases D0 and D1, nor does it depend on the specific query being asked, the
mechanism achieves the exact composed privacy region universally for every pair of neighboring
databases simultaneously.
Among the mechanisms guaranteeing the same level of privacy, one with larger privacy region
under composition is considered better, in terms of allowing for smaller false alarm and missed
detection rate in hypothesis testing whether the database contains a particular entry or not. In
this sense, larger privacy degradation under composition has more utility. The geometric mechanism
has the largest possible privacy degradation under composition, stated formally below; the proof is
deferred to Appendix C.
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Theorem 4.4. Under the k-fold composition experiment of counting queries, the geometric mech-
anism achieves the largest privacy region among all (ε, 0)-differentially private mechanisms, uni-
versally for every pair of neighboring databases simultaneously.
5 Applications of the Operational Interpretation to Private Multi-
Party Computation
In this section, we showcase the power of the operational interpretation of differential privacy in
the differentially private multi-party computation (MPC) setting [BNO08, DKM+06b, MMP+10,
GMPS13]. We study the following problem of secure multi-party differential privacy: each party
possesses a single bit of information; the information bits are statistically independent. Each party
is interested in computing a function, which could differ from party to party, and there could
be a central observer (observing the entire transcript of the interactive communication protocol)
interested in computing a separate function. The interactive communication is achieved via a
broadcast channel that all parties and central observer can hear. It is useful to distinguish between
two types of communication protocols: interactive and non-interactive. We say a communication
protocol is non-interactive if a message broadcasted by one party does not depend on the messages
broadcasted by any other parties. In contrast, interactive protocols allows the messages at any
stage of the communication to depend on all the previous messages.
Our main result is the exact optimality of a simple non-interactive protocol in terms of max-
imizing accuracy for given privacy levels: each party randomizes (sufficiently) and publishes its
own bit. Each party and the central observer then separately compute their respective decision
functions to maximize the appropriate notion of their accuracy measure. The optimality is general:
it holds for all types of functions, heterogeneous privacy conditions on the parties, all types of
cost metrics, and both average and worst-case (over the inputs) measures of accuracy. Finally, the
optimality result is simultaneous, in terms of maximizing accuracy at each of the parties and the
central observer. Each party only needs to know its own desired level of privacy, its own function
to be computed, and its measure of accuracy. Optimal data release and optimal decision making
are naturally separated.
The proof of this result critically relies on the operational interpretation of differential privacy.
In this multi-party and local privacy setting, we show that the randomized response still dominates
any other (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms. Given this, any other mechanism, interactive or
not, can be simulated at the receiver. This powerful technique bypasses the previous results on
the same setting, where weaker results were proved with heavier proof techniques. In [GMPS13],
optimal mechanisms are proposed for only two-party computation and only for AND and XOR func-
tions. In [KOV15], only (ε, 0)-differential privacy is addressed, and the proof techniques developed
in [KOV15] cannot be generalized to the more general (ε, δ)-differential privacy setting.
5.1 Problem Statement
Consider the setting where there are k parties, each with its own private binary data xi ∈ {0, 1}
generated independently. The independence assumption here is necessary because without it each
party can learn something about others, which violates differential privacy, even without revealing
any information. Differential privacy implicitly imposes independence in a multi-party setting.
The goal of each party i ∈ [k] is to compute an arbitrary function fi : {0, 1}k → Y of interest
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by interactively broadcasting messages. There might be a central observer who listens to all the
messages being broadcasted, and wants to compute another arbitrary function f0 : {0, 1} → Y.
The k parties are honest in the sense that once they agree on what protocol to follow, every party
follows the rules. At the same time, they can be curious, and each party needs to ensure that other
parties cannot learn its bit with sufficient confidence. This is done by imposing local differential
privacy constraints. This setting is similar to the one studied in [DJW13, KOV14b] in the sense
that there are multiple privacy barriers, each one separating an individual party from the rest of
the world. However, the main difference is that we consider multi-party computation, where there
are multiple functions to be computed, and each node might possess a different function to be
computed.
Let x = [x1, . . . , xk] ∈ {0, 1}k denote the vector of k bits, and x−i = [x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xk] ∈
{0, 1}k−1 is the vector of bits except for the i-th bit. The parties agree on an interactive protocol to
achieve the goal of multi-party computation. A ‘transcript’ is the output of the protocol, and is a
random instance of all broadcasted messages until all communication terminates. The probability
that a transcript τ is broadcasted (via a series of interactive communications) when the data is x
is denoted by Px,τ = P(τ |x) for x ∈ {0, 1}k and for τ ∈ T . Then, a protocol can be represented
as a matrix denoting the probability distribution over a set of transcripts T conditioned on x:
P = [Px,τ ] ∈ [0, 1]2k×|T |.
In the end, each party makes a decision on what the value of function fi is, based on its own
bit xi and the transcript τ that was broadcasted. A decision rule is a mapping from a transcript
τ ∈ T and private bit xi ∈ {0, 1} to a decision y ∈ Y represented by a function fˆi(τ, xi). We
allow randomized decision rules, in which case fˆi(τ, xi) can be a random variable. For the central
observer, a decision rule is a function of just the transcript, denoted by a function fˆ0(τ).
We consider two notions of accuracy: the average accuracy and the worst-case accuracy. For the
i-th party, consider an accuracy measure wi : Y ×Y → R (or equivalently a negative cost function)
such that wi(fi(x), fˆi(τ, xi)) measures the accuracy when the function to be computed is fi(x) and
the approximation is fˆi(τ, xi). Then the average accuracy for this i-th party is defined as
ACCave(P,wi, fi, fˆi) ≡ 1
2k
∑
x∈{0,1}k
Efˆi,Px,τ [wi(fi(x), fˆi(τ, xi))] , (9)
where the expectation is taken over the random transcript τ and any randomness in the decision
function fˆi. For example, if the accuracy measure is an indicator such that wi(y, y
′) = I(y=y′),
then ACCave measures the average probability of getting the correct function output. For a given
protocol P , it takes (2k |T |) operations to compute the optimal decision rule:
f∗i,ave(τ, xi) = arg max
y∈Y
∑
x−i∈{0,1}k−1
Px,τ wi(fi(x), y) , (10)
for each i ∈ [k]. The computational cost of (2k |T |) for computing the optimal decision rule
is unavoidable in general, since that is the inherent complexity of the problem: describing the
distribution of the transcript requires the same cost. We will show that the optimal protocol
requires a set of transcripts of size |T | = 2k, and the computational complexity of the decision rule
for a general function is 22k. However, for a fixed protocol, this decision rule needs to be computed
only once before any message is transmitted. Further, it is also possible to find a closed form
solution for the decision rule when f has a simple structure. One example is the XOR function
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where the optimal decision rule is as simple as evaluating the XOR of all the received bits, which
requires O(k) operations. When there are multiple maximizers y, we can choose either one of them
arbitrarily, and it follows that there is no gain in randomizing the decision rule for average accuracy.
Similarly, the worst-case accuracy is defined as
ACCwc(P,wi, fi, fˆi) ≡ min
x∈{0,1}k
Efˆi,Px,τ [wi(fi(x), fˆi(τ, xi))] . (11)
For worst-case accuracy, given a protocol P , the optimal decision rule of the i-th party with a bit
xi can be computed by solving the following convex program:
Q(xi) = arg max
Q∈R|T |×|Y|
min
x−i∈{0,1}k−1
∑
τ∈T
∑
y∈Y
Px,τ wi(fi(x), y)Qτ,y (12)
subject to
∑
y∈Y
Qτ,y = 1 , ∀τ ∈ T and Q ≥ 0
The optimal (random) decision rule f∗i,wc(τ, xi) is to output y given transcript τ according to
P(y|τ, xi) = Q(xi)τ,y . This can be formulated as a linear program with |T | × |Y| variables and
2k + |T | constraints. Again, it is possible to find a closed form solution for the decision rule when f
has a simple structure: for the XOR function, the optimal decision rule is again evaluating the XOR
of all the received bits requiring O(k) operations. For a central observer, the accuracy measures
are defined similarly, and the optimal decision rule is now
f∗0,ave(τ) = arg max
y∈Y
∑
x∈{0,1}k
Px,τ w0(f0(x), y) , (13)
and for worst-case accuracy the optimal (random) decision rule f∗0,wc(τ) is to output y given tran-
script τ according to P(y|τ) = Q(0)τ,y.
Q(0) = arg max
Q∈R|T |×|Y|
min
x∈{0,1}k
∑
τ∈T
∑
y∈Y
Px,τ w0(f0(x), y)Qτ,y (14)
subject to
∑
y∈Y
Qτ,y = 1 , ∀τ ∈ T and Q ≥ 0
where w0 : Y × Y → R is the measure of accuracy for the central observer.
Privacy is measured by approximate differential privacy [Dwo06, DMNS06]. Since we allow
heterogeneous privacy constraints, we use (εi, δi) to denote the desired privacy level of the i-th
party. We say that a protocol P is (εi, δi)-differentially private for the i-th party if for i ∈ [k], and
all xi, x
′
i ∈ {0, 1}, x−i ∈ {0, 1}k−1, and S ⊆ T ,
P(τ ∈ S|xi, x−i) ≤ eεi P(τ ∈ S|x′i, x−i) + δi . (15)
This condition ensures that no adversary can infer the private data xi with high enough confidence,
no matter what auxiliary information or computational power she might.
Consider the following simple protocol known as the randomized response, which is a term first
coined by [War65] and commonly used in many private communications including the multi-party
setting [MMP+10]. We will show in Section 5.2 that this is the optimal protocol that simultaneously
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maximizes the accuracy for all the parties. Each party broadcasts a randomized version of its bit
denoted by x˜i such that
x˜i =

0 if xi = 0 with probability δi ,
1 if xi = 0 with probability
(1−δi)eεi
1+eεi ,
2 if xi = 0 with probability
(1−δi)
1+eεi ,
3 if xi = 0 with probability 0 ,
x˜i =

0 if xi = 1 with probability 0 ,
1 if xi = 1 with probability
(1−δi)
1+eεi ,
2 if xi = 1 with probability
(1−δi)eεi
1+eεi ,
3 if xi = 1 with probability δi .
(16)
The reason this randomized response is optimal is that under the hypothesis testing interpretation
of differential privacy, this mechanisms achieves the largest hypothesis testing region, i.e. R(x˜i, xi =
0, xi = 1) = R(εi, δi) as shown in Figure 1.
5.2 Main Result
We show, perhaps surprisingly, that the simple randomized response presented in (16) is the unique
optimal protocol in a very general sense. For any desired privacy level (εi, δi), and arbitrary function
fi, for any accuracy measure wi, and any notion of accuracy (either average or worst case), we show
that the randomized response is universally optimal.
Theorem 5.1. Let the optimal decision rule be defined as in (10) for the average accuracy and (12)
for the worst-case accuracy. Then, for any (εi, δi), any function fi : {0, 1}k → Y, and any accuracy
measure wi : Y × Y → R for i ∈ [k], the randomized response for given (εi, δi) with the optimal
decision function achieves the maximum accuracy for the i-th party among all {(εi, δi)}-differentially
private interactive protocols and all decision rules. For the central observer, the randomized response
with the optimal decision rule defined in (13) and (14) achieves the maximum accuracy among all
{(εi, δi)}-differentially private interactive protocols and all decision rules for any arbitrary function
f0 and any measure of accuracy w0.
This is a strong optimality result. Every party and the central observer can simultaneously
achieve the optimal accuracy, using a universal randomized response. Each party only needs to
know its own desired level of privacy, its own function to be computed, and its measure of accuracy.
Optimal data release and optimal decision making are naturally separated. It is not immediate at
all that such a simple non-interactive randomized response mechanism would achieve the maximum
accuracy. The proof critically harnesses the data processing inequalities and is provided in Appendix
D.
6 Proof of Theorem 3.3
We first propose a simple mechanism and prove that the proposed mechanism dominates over
all (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms. Analyzing the privacy region achieved by the k-fold
composition of the proposed mechanism, we get a bound on the privacy region under the adaptive
composition. This gives an exact characterization of privacy under composition, since we show
both converse and achievability. We prove that no other family of mechanisms can achieve ‘more
degraded’ privacy (converse), and that there is a mechanism that we propose which achieves the
privacy region (achievability).
15
6.1 Achievability
We propose the following simple mechanism M˜i at the i-th step in the composition. Null hypothesis
(b = 0) outcomes Xi,0 = Mi(D
i,0, qi)’s which are independent and identically distributed as a
discrete random variable X˜0 ∼ P˜0(·), where
P(X˜0 = x) = P˜0(x) ≡

δ for x = 0 ,
(1−δ) eε
1+eε for x = 1 ,
1−δ
1+eε for x = 2 ,
0 for x = 3 .
(17)
Alternative hypothesis (b = 1) outcomes Xi,1 = Mi(D
i,1, qi)’s are independent and identically
distributed as a discrete random variable X˜1 ∼ P˜1(·), where
P(X˜1 = x) = P˜1(x) ≡

0 for x = 0 ,
1−δ
1+eε for x = 1 ,
(1−δ) eε
1+eε for x = 2 ,
δ for x = 3 .
(18)
In particular, the output of this mechanism does not depend on the database Di,b or the query qi,
and only depends on the hypothesis b. The privacy region of a single access to this mechanism
is R(ε, δ) in Figure 1. Hence, by Theorem 2.5, all (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms are
dominated by this mechanism.
In general, the privacy region R(M,D0, D1) of any mechanism can be represented as an in-
tersection of multiple {(ε˜j , δ˜j)} privacy regions. For a mechanism M , we can compute the (ε˜j , δ˜j)
pairs representing the privacy region as follows. Given a null hypothesis database D0, an alternative
hypothesis database D1, and a mechanism M whose output space is X , let P0 and P1 denote the
probability density function of the outputs M(D0) and M(D1) respectively. To simplify notations
we assume that P0 and P1 are symmetric, i.e. there exists a permutation pi over X such that
P0(x) = P1(pi(x)) and P1(x) = P0(pi(x)). This ensures that we get a symmetric privacy region.
The privacy region R(M,D0, D1) can be described by its boundaries. Since it is a convex set,
a tangent line on the boundary with slope −eε˜j can be represented by the smallest δ˜j such that
PFA ≥ −eε˜jPMD + 1− δ˜j , (19)
for all rejection sets (cf. Figure 3). Letting S denote the complement of a rejection set, such that
PFA = 1−P0(S) and PMD = P1(S), the minimum shift δ˜j that still ensures that the privacy region
is above the line (19) is defined as δ˜j = dε˜j (P0, P1) where
dε˜(P0, P1) ≡ max
S⊆X
{
P0(S)− eε˜ P1(S)
}
.
The privacy region of a mechanism is completely described by the set of slopes and shifts, {(ε˜j , δ˜j) :
ε˜j ∈ E and δ˜j = dε˜j (P0, P1)}, where
E ≡ { 0 ≤ ε˜ <∞ : P0(x) = eε˜ P1(x) for some x ∈ X} .
Any ε˜ /∈ E does not contribute to the boundary of the privacy region. For the above example
distributions P˜0 and P˜1, E = {ε} and dε(P˜0, P˜1) = δ.
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Remark 6.1. For a database access mechanism M over a output space X and a pair of neighboring
databases D0 and D1, let P0 and P1 denote the probability density function for random variables
M(D0) and M(D1) respectively. Assume there exists a permutation pi over X such that P0(x) =
P1(pi(x)). Then, the privacy region is
R(M,D0, D1 ) =
⋂
ε˜∈E
R( ε˜, dε˜(P0, P1) ) ,
where R(M,D,D′) and R(ε˜, δ˜) are defined as in (3) and (2).
The symmetry assumption is to simplify notations, and the analysis can be easily generalized
to deal with non-symmetric distributions.
Now consider a k-fold composition experiment, where at each sequential access M˜i, we re-
ceive a random output Xi,b independent and identically distributed as X˜b. We can explicitly
characterize the distribution of k-fold composition of the outcomes: P(X1,b = x1, . . . , Xk,b =
xk) =
∏k
x=1 P˜b(xi). It follows form the structure of these two discrete distributions that, E =
{e(k−2bk/2c)ε, e(k+2−2bk/2c)ε, . . . , e(k−2)ε, ekε}. After some algebra, it also follows that
d(k−2i)ε
(
(P˜0)
k, (P˜1)
k
)
= 1− (1− δ)k + (1− δ)k
∑i−1
`=0
(
k
`
)(
eε(k−`) − eε(k−2i+`))
(1 + eε)k
.
for i ∈ {0, . . . , bk/2c}. From Remark 6.1, it follows that the privacy region is R({εi, δi}) =⋂bk/2c
i=0 R
(
εi, δi
)
, where εi = (k − 2i)ε and δi’s are defined as in (6). Figure 2 shows this privacy
region for k = 1, . . . , 5 and for ε = 0.4 and for two values of δ = 0 and δ = 0.1.
6.2 Converse
We will now prove that this region is the largest region achievable under k-fold adaptive composition
of any (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms.
From Corollary 2.3, any mechanism whose privacy region is included in R({εi, δi}) satisfies
(ε˜, δ˜)-differential privacy. We are left to prove that for the family of all (ε, δ)-differentially private
mechanisms, the privacy region of the k-fold composition experiment is included inside R({εi, δi}).
To this end, consider the following composition experiment, which reproduces the view of the
adversary from the original composition experiment.
At each time step i, we generate a random variable Xi,b distributed as X˜b independent of
any other random events, and call this the output of a database access mechanism M˜i such that
M˜i(D
i,b, qi) = X
i,b. Since, Xi,b only depends on b, and is independent of the actual database or
the query, we use M˜i(b) to denote this outcome.
We know that M˜i(b) has privacy region R(ε, δ) for any choices of Di,0, Di,1 and qi. Now con-
sider the mechanism Mi from the original experiment. Since it is (ε, δ)-differentially private, we
know from Theorem 2.1 that R(Mi, Di,0, Di,1) ⊆ R(ε, δ) for any choice of neighboring databases
Di,0, Di,1. Hence, from the converse of data processing inequality (Theorem 2.5), we know that
there exists a mechanism Ti that takes as input X
i,b and produces an output Y i,b which is dis-
tributed as Mi(D
i,b, qi) for all b ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, Y i,b is independent of the past conditioned on
Xi,b, Di,0, Di,1, qi,Mi. Precisely we have the following Markov chain:
(b, R, {X`,b, D`,0, D`,1, q`,M`}`∈[i−1])–(Xi,b, Di,0, Di,1, qi,Mi)–Y i,b ,
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where R is any internal randomness of the adversary A. Since, (X,Y )–Z–W implies X–(Y,Z)–W ,
we have
b–(R, {X`,b, D`,0, D`,1, q`,M`}`∈[i])–Y i,b .
Notice that if we know R and the outcomes {Y `,b}`∈[i], then we can reproduce the original exper-
iment until time i. This is because the choices of Di,0, Di,1, qi,Mi are exactly specified by R and
{Y `,b}`∈[i]. Hence, we can simplify the Markov chain as
b–(R,Xi,b, {X`,b, Y `,b}`∈[i−1])–Y i,b . (20)
Further, since Xi,b is independent of the past conditioned on b, we have
Xi,b–b–(R, {X`,b, Y `,b}`∈[i−1]) . (21)
It follows that
P(b, r, x1 . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk) = P(b, r, x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk−1)P(yk|r, x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk−1)
= P(b, r, x1, . . . , xk−1, y1, . . . , yk−1)P(xk|b)P(yk|r, x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk−1) ,
where we used (20) in the first equality and (21) in the second. By induction, we get a decomposition
P(b, r, x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk) = P(b, r)
k∏
i=1
P(xi|b)
k∏
i=1
P(yi|r, x1, . . . , xi, y1, . . . , yi−1)
= P(b, r, x1, . . . , xk)P(y1, . . . , yk|r, x1, . . . , xk)
= P(b|r, x1, . . . , xk)P(y1, . . . , yk, r, x1, . . . , xk) .
From the construction of the experiment, it also follows that the internal randomness R is inde-
pendent of the hypothesis b and the outcomes Xi,b’s: P(b|r, x1, . . . , xk) = P(b|x1, . . . , xk). Then,
marginalizing over R, we get P(b, x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk) = P(b|x1, . . . , xk)P(y1, . . . , yk, x1, . . . , xk).
This implies the following Markov chain:
b–({Xi,b}i∈[k])–({Y i,b}i∈[k]) , (22)
and it follows that a set of mechanisms (M1, . . . ,Mk) dominates (M˜1, . . . , M˜k) for two databases
{Di,0}i∈[k] and {Di,1}i∈[k]. By the data processing inequality for differential privacy (Theorem 2.4),
this implies that
R({Mi}i∈[k], {Di,0}i∈[k], {Di,1}i∈[k]) ⊆ R({M˜i}i∈[k], {Di,0}i∈[k], {Di,1}i∈[k]) = R({εi, δi}) .
This finishes the proof of the desired claim.
Alternatively, one can prove (22), using a probabilistic graphical model. Precisely, the following
Bayesian network describes the dependencies among various random quantities of the experiment
described above. Since the set of nodes (X1,b, X2,b, X3,b, X4,b) d-separates node b from the rest of
the bayesian network, it follows immediately from the Markov property of this Bayesian network
that (22) is true (cf. [Lau96]).
18
b R
X1,b
X2,b
X3,b
X4,b
Y 1,b
Y 2,b
Y 3,b
Y 4,b
D1,0, D1,1, q1,M1
D2,0, D2,1, q2,M2
D3,0, D3,1, q3,M3
D4,0, D4,1, q4,M4
Figure 4: Bayesian network representation of the composition experiment. The subset of nodes
(X1,b, X2,b, X3,b, X4,b) d-separates node b from the rest of the network.
7 Proof of Theorem 3.4
We need to provide an outer bound on the privacy region achieved by X˜0 and X˜1 defined in (17)
and (18) under k-fold composition. Let P0 denote the probability mass function of X˜0 and P1
denote the PMF of X˜1. Also, let P
k
0 and P
k
1 denote the joint PMF of k i.i.d. copies of X˜0 and X˜1
respectively. Also, for a set S ⊆ X k, we let P k0 (S) =
∑
x∈S P
k
0 (x). In our example, X = {1, 2, 3, 4},
and
P0 =
[
δ (1−δ)e
ε
1+eε
1−δ
1+eε 0
]
,
P1 =
[
0 1−δ1+eε
(1−δ)eε
1+eε δ
]
,
P 20 =

δ2 δ (1−δ)e
ε
1+eε δ
(1−δ)
1+eε 0
δ (1−δ)e
ε
1+eε
(
(1−δ)eε
1+eε
)2 (
1−δ
1+eε
)2
eε 0
δ 1−δ1+eε
(
1−δ
1+eε
)2
eε
(
1−δ
1+eε
)2
0
0 0 0 0
 , etc.
We can compute the privacy region from P k0 and P
k
1 directly, by computing the line tangent to
the boundary. A tangent line with slope −eε˜ can be represented as
PFA = −eε˜PMD + 1− dε˜(P k0 , P k1 ) . (23)
To find the tangent line, we need to maximize the shift, which is equivalent to moving the line
downward until it is tangent to the boundary of the privacy region (cf. Figure 3).
dε˜(P
k
0 , P
k
1 ) ≡ max
S⊆Xk
P k0 (S)− eε˜P k1 (S) .
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Notice that the maximum is achieved by a set B ≡ {x ∈ X k |P k0 (x) ≥ eε˜P k1 (x)}. Then,
dε˜(P
k
0 , P
k
1 ) = P
k
0 (B)− eε˜P k1 (B) .
For the purpose of proving the bound of the form (7), we separate the analysis of the above
formula into two parts: one where either P k0 (x) or P
k
1 (x) is zero and the other when both are
positive. Effectively, this separation allows us to treat the effects of (ε, 0)-differential privacy and
(0, δ)-differential privacy separately. In previous work [DRV10], they separated the analysis in a
similar way. Here we provide a simpler proof technique. Further, all the proof techniques we use
naturally generalize to compositions of general (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms other than
the specific example of X˜0 and X˜1 we consider in this section.
Let X˜k0 denote a k-dimensional random vector whose entries are independent copies of X˜0.
We partition B into two sets: B = B0
⋃
B1 and B0
⋂
B1 = ∅. Let B0 ≡ {x ∈ X k : P k0 (x) ≥
eε˜P k1 (x), and P
k
1 (x) = 0} and B1 ≡ {x ∈ X k : P k0 (x) ≥ eε˜P k1 (x), and P k1 (x) > 0}. Then, it is not
hard to see that P k0 (B0) = 1−P(X˜k0 ∈ {1, 2, 3}k) = 1−(1−δ)k, P k1 (B0) = 0, P k0 (B1) = P k0 (B1|X˜k0 ∈
{1, 2}k)P(X˜k0 ∈ {1, 2}k) = (1 − δ)k P k0 (B1|X˜k0 ∈ {1, 2}k), and P k1 (B1) = (1 − δ)k P k1 (B1|X˜k1 ∈
{1, 2}k). It follows that
P k0 (B0)− eε˜P k1 (B0) = 1− (1− δ)k , and
P k0 (B1)− eε˜P k1 (B1) = (1− δ)k
(
P k0 (B1|X˜k0 ∈ {1, 2}k)− eε˜P k1 (B1|X˜k1 ∈ {1, 2}k)
)
.
Let P˜ k0 (x) ≡ P k0 (x|x ∈ {1, 2}k) and P˜ k1 (x) ≡ P k1 (x|x ∈ {1, 2}k). Then, we have
dε˜(P
k
0 , P
k
1 ) = P
k
0 (B0)− eε˜P k1 (B0) + P k0 (B1)− eε˜P k1 (B1)
= 1− (1− δ)k + (1− δ)k(P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1)) . (24)
Now, we focus on upper bounding P˜ k0 (B1) − eε˜P˜ k1 (B1), using a variant of Chernoff’s tail bound.
Notice that
P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1) = EP˜k0
[
I(
log(P˜k0 (X˜
k)/P˜k1 (X˜
k))≥ε˜
)]− eε˜EP˜k0 [I( log(P˜k0 (X˜k)/P˜k1 (X˜k))≥ε˜) P˜ k1 (X˜k)P˜ k0 (X˜k)
]
= EP˜k0
[
I(
log(P˜k0 (X˜
k)/P˜k1 (X˜
k))≥ε˜
)(1− eε˜ P˜ k1 (X˜k)
P˜ k0 (X˜
k)
)]
≤ E[eλZ−λε˜+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1)] , (25)
where we use a random variable Z ≡ log(P˜ k0 (X˜k0 )/P˜ k1 (X˜k0 )) and the last line follows from I(x≥ε˜)(1−
eε˜−x) ≤ eλ(x−ε˜)+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1) for any λ ≥ 0. To show this inequality, notice that the right-
hand side is always non-negative. So it is sufficient to show that the inequality holds, without the
indicator on the left-hand side. Precisely, let f(x) = eλ(x−ε˜)+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1) + eε˜−x− 1. This is
a convex function with f(x∗) = 0 and f ′(x∗) = 0 at x∗ = ε˜+ log((λ+ 1)/λ). It follows that this is
a non-negative function.
Next, we give an upper bound on the moment generating function of Z.
EP˜0 [e
λ log(P0(X)/P1(X))] =
eε
eε + 1
eλε +
1
eε + 1
e−λε
≤ e e
ε−1
eε+1
λε+ 1
2
λ2ε2 ,
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for any λ, which follows from the fact that pex + (1 − p)e−x ≤ e(2p−1)x+(1/2)x2 for any x ∈ R and
p ∈ [0, 1] [AS04, Lemma A.1.5]. Substituting this into (25) with a choice of λ = ε˜−kε(eε−1)/(eε+1)
kε2
,
we get
P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1) ≤ exp
{eε − 1
eε + 1
λεk +
1
2
λ2ε2k − λε˜+ λ log λ− (λ+ 1) log(λ+ 1)
}
= exp
{
− kε
2
2
(
λ− 1
kε2
(
ε˜− kεe
ε − 1
eε + 1
))2 − 1
2kε2
(
ε˜− kε(e
ε − 1)
eε + 1
)2
+ λ log
λ
λ+ 1
− log(λ+ 1)
}
≤ exp
{
− 1
2kε2
(
ε˜− kεe
ε − 1
eε + 1
)2 − log(λ+ 1)}
≤ 1
1 + ε˜−kε(e
ε−1)/(eε+1)
kε2
exp
{
− 1
2kε2
(
ε˜− kεe
ε − 1
eε + 1
)2 }
=
1
1 +
√
2kε2 log(e+(
√
kε2/δ˜))
kε2
1
e+
√
kε2
δ˜
≤ 1√
kε2 +
√
2 log(e+ (
√
kε2/δ˜))
δ˜
eδ˜√
kε2
+ 1
,
for our choice of ε˜ = kε(eε − 1)/(eε + 1) + ε
√
2k log(e+ (
√
kε2/δ˜)). The right-hand side is always
less than δ˜.
Similarly, one can show that the right-hand side is less than δ˜ for the choice of ε˜ = kε(eε −
1)/(eε+1)+ε
√
2k log(1/δ˜). We get that the k-fold composition is (ε˜, 1−(1−δ)k(1−δ˜))-differentially
private.
8 Proof of Theorem 3.5
In this section, we closely follow the proof of Theorem 3.4 in Section 7 carefully keeping the
dependence on `, the index of the composition step. For brevity, we omit the details which overlap
with the proof of Theorem 3.4. By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we only
need to provide an outer bound on the privacy region achieved by X˜
(`)
0 and X˜
(`)
1 under k-fold
composition, defined as
P(X˜(`)0 = x) = P˜
(`)
0 (x) ≡

δ` for x = 0 ,
(1−δ`) eε`
1+eε` for x = 1 ,
1−δ`
1+eε` for x = 2 ,
0 for x = 3 .
, and
P(X˜(`)1 = x) = P˜
(`)
1 (x) ≡

0 for x = 0 ,
1−δ`
1+eε` for x = 1 ,
(1−δ`) eε`
1+eε` for x = 2 ,
δ` for x = 3 .
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Using the similar notations as Section 7, it follows that under k-fold composition,
dε˜(P
k
0 , P
k
1 ) = 1−
k∏
`=1
(1− δ`) +
(
P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1)
) k∏
`=1
(1− δ`) . (26)
Now, we focus on upper bounding P˜ k0 (B1) − eε˜P˜ k1 (B1), using a variant of Chernoff’s tail bound.
We know that
P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1) = EP˜k0
[
I(
log(P˜k0 (X˜
k)/P˜k1 (X˜
k))≥ε˜
)]− eε˜EP˜k0 [I( log(P˜k0 (X˜k)/P˜k1 (X˜k))≥ε˜) P˜ k1 (X˜k)P˜ k0 (X˜k)
]
= EP˜k0
[
I(
log(P˜k0 (X˜
k)/P˜k1 (X˜
k))≥ε˜
)(1− eε˜ P˜ k1 (X˜k)
P˜ k0 (X˜
k)
)]
≤ E[eλZ−λε˜+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1)] , (27)
where we use a random variable Z ≡ log(P˜ k0 (X˜k0 )/P˜ k1 (X˜k0 )) and the last line follows from the fact
that I(x≥ε˜)(1− eε˜−x) ≤ eλ(x−ε˜)+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1) for any λ ≥ 0.
Next, we give an upper bounds on the moment generating function of Z. From the definition
of P˜
(`)
0 and P˜
(`)
1 , E[eλZ ] =
(
E
P˜
(`)
0
[eλ log(P˜
(`)
0 (X˜
(`)
0 )/P˜
(`)
1 (X˜
(`)
0 ))]
)k
. Let ε˜ =
∑k
`=1(e
ε` − 1)ε`/(eε` +
1) +
√
2
∑k
`=1 ε
2
` log
(
e+ (
√∑k
`=1 ε
2
`/δ˜)
)
. Next we show that the k-fold composition is (ε˜, 1− (1−
δ˜)
∏
`∈[k](1− δ`) )-differentially private.
E
P˜
(`)
0
[eλ log(P
(`)
0 (X)/P
(`)
1 (X))] ≤ e e
ε`−1
eε`+1
λε`+
1
2
λ2ε`
2
,
for any λ. Substituting this into (27) with a choice of λ =
ε˜−∑`∈[k] ε`(eε`−1)/(eε`+1)∑
`∈[k] ε
2
`
, we get
P˜ k0 (B1)− eε˜P˜ k1 (B1) ≤
1
1 +
ε˜−∑`∈[k] ε`(eε`−1)/(eε`+1)∑
`∈[k] ε
2
`
exp
{
− 1
2
∑
`∈[k] ε
2
`
(
ε˜−
∑
`∈[k]
ε`
eε` − 1
eε` + 1
)2 }
.
Substituting ε˜, we get the desired bound.
Similarly, we can prove that with ε˜ =
∑k
`=1(e
ε` − 1)ε`/(eε` + 1) +
√
2
∑k
`=1 ε
2
` log
(
1/δ˜
)
, the
desired bound also holds.
9 Proofs
9.1 Proof of Theorem 2.4
Consider hypothesis testing between D1 and D2. If there is a point (PMD, PFA) achieved by M
′
but not by M , then we claim that this is a contradiction to the assumption that D–X–Y form
a Markov chain. Consider a decision maker who have only access to the output of M . Under
the Markov chain assumption, he can simulate the output of M ′ by generating a random variable
Y conditioned on M(D) and achieve every point in the privacy region of M ′ (cf. Theorem 2.2).
Hence, the privacy region of M ′ must be included in the privacy region of M .
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9.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
First we prove that (ε, δ)-differential privacy implies (1). From the definition of differential privacy,
we know that for all rejection set S ⊆ X , P(M(D0) ∈ S¯) ≤ eεP(M(D1) ∈ S¯) + δ. This implies
1−PFA(D0, D1,M, S) ≤ eεPMD(D0, D1,M, S) + δ. This implies the first inequality of (1), and the
second one follows similarly.
The converse follows analogously. For any set S, we assume 1−PFA(D0, D1,M, S) ≤ eεPMD(D0, D1,M, S)+
δ. Then, it follows that P(M(D0) ∈ S¯) ≤ eεP(M(D1) ∈ S¯) + δ for all choices of S ⊆ X . Together
with the symmetric condition P(M(D1) ∈ S¯) ≤ eεP(M(D0) ∈ S¯)+δ , this implies (ε, δ)-differential
privacy.
9.3 Proof of Remark 2.2
We have a decision rule γ represented by a partition {Si}i∈{1,...,N} and corresponding accept prob-
abilities {pi}i∈{1,...,N}, such that if the output is in a set Si, we accept with probability pi. We
assume the subsets are sorted such that 1 ≥ p1 ≥ . . . ≥ pN ≥ 0. Then, the probability of false
alarm is
PFA(D0, D1,M, γ) =
N∑
i=1
pi P(M(D0) ∈ Si) = pN +
N∑
i=2
(pi−1 − pi)P(M(D0) ∈ ∪j<iSj) .
and similarly, PMD(D0, D1,M, γ) = (1 − p1) +
∑N
i=2(pi−1 − pi)P(M(D1) /∈ ∪j<iSj). Recall that
PFA(D0, D1,M, S) = P(M(D0) ∈ S) and PMD(D0, D1,M, S) = P(M(D1) ∈ S¯). So for any decision
rule γ, we can represent the pair (PMD, PFA) as a convex combination:(
PMD(D0, D1,M, γ), PFA(D0, D1,M, γ)
)
=
N+1∑
i=1
(pi−1 − pi)
(
PMD(D0, D1,M,∪j<iSj), PFA(D0, D1,M,∪j<iSj)
)
,
where we used p0 = 1 and pN+1 = 0, and hence it is included in the convex hull of the privacy
region achieved by decision rules with hard thresholding.
10 Acknowledgement
The authors thank Maxim Raginsky for helpful discussions and for pointing out [Bla53], and Moritz
Hardt for pointing out an error in an earlier version of this paper. This research is supported in
part by NSF CISE award CCF-1422278, NSF SaTC award CNS-1527754, NSF CMMI award MES-
1450848 and NSF ENG award ECCS-1232257.
A Examples illustrating the strengths of graphical representation
of differential privacy
Remark A.1. The following statements are true.
(a) If a mechanism is (ε, δ)-differentially private, then it is (ε˜, δ˜)-differentially private for all pairs
of ε˜ and δ˜ ≥ δ satisfying
1− δ
1 + eε
≥ 1− δ˜
1 + eε˜
.
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(b) For a pair of neighboring databases D and D′, and all (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms,
the total variation distance defined as ‖M(D) − M(D′)‖TV = maxS⊆X P(M(D′) ∈ S) −
P(M(D) ∈ S) is bounded by
sup
(ε, δ)-differentially private M
‖M(D)−M(D′)‖TV ≤ 1− 2(1− δ)
1 + eε
.
Proof. Proof of (a). From Figure 1, it is immediate that R(ε, δ) ⊆ R(ε˜, δ˜) when the conditions
are satisfied. Then, for a (ε, δ)-private M , it follows from R(M) ⊆ R(ε, δ) ⊆ R(ε˜, δ˜) that M is
(ε˜, δ˜)-differentially private.
Proof of (b). By definition, ‖M(D) −M(D′)‖TV = maxS⊆X P(M(D′) ∈ S) − P(M(D) ∈ S).
Letting S be the rejection region in our hypothesis testing setting, the total variation distance is
defined by the following optimization problem:
max
S
1− PMD(S)− PFA(S) (28)
subject to (PMD(S), PFA(S)) ∈ R(ε, δ), for all S ⊆ X .
From Figure 1 it follows immediately that the total variation distance cannot be larger than δ +
(1− δ)(eε − 1)/(eε + 1). 
B Analysis of the Gaussian mechanism in Theorem 4.3
Following the analysis in Section 7, we know that the privacy region of a composition of mechanisms
is described by a set of (ε, δ) pairs that satisfy the following:
δ = µk0(B)− eεµk1(B) ,
where µk0 and µ
k
1 are probability measures of the mechanism under k-fold composition when the
data base is D0 and D1 respectively, and the subset B = arg maxS⊆Rk µk0(S)− eεµk1(S).
In the case of Gaussian mechanisms, we can assume without loss of generality that D0 is such
that qi(D0) = 0 and D1 is such that qi(D1) = ∆ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. When adding Gaussian noises
with variances σ2, we want to ask how small the variance can be and still ensure (ε, δ)-differential
privacy under k-fold composition.
Let fk0 (x1, . . . , xk) =
∏k
i=1 f0(xi) = (1/
√
2piσ2)ke−
∑k
i=1 x
2
i /2σ
2
and fk1 (x1 . . . , xk) =
∏k
i=1 f1(xi) =
(1/
√
2piσ2)ke−
∑k
i=1(xi−∆)2/2σ2 be the probability density functions of Gaussians centered at zero
and ∆1k respectively. Using a similar technique as in (25), we know that
µk0(B)− eεµk1(B) = Eµk0
[
I(
log(fk0 (X˜
k)/fk1 (X˜
k))≥ε
)]− eεEµk0 [I( log(fk0 (X˜k)/fk1 (X˜k))≥ε) fk1 (X˜k)fk0 (X˜k)
]
= Eµk0
[
I(
log(fk0 (X˜
k)/fk1 (X˜
k))≥ε
)(1− eε fk1 (X˜k)
fk0 (X˜
k)
)]
≤ E[eλZ−λε+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1)] , (29)
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where X˜k is a random vector distributed according to µk0, Z ≡ log(fk0 (X˜k)/fk1 (X˜k)), and the last
line follows from I(x≥ε)(1− eε−x) ≤ eλ(x−ε)+λ log λ−(λ+1) log(λ+1) for any λ ≥ 0.
Next, we give an upper bound on the moment generating function of Z.
Eµ0 [eλ log(f0(X)/f1(X))] = E[e−λ∆X/σ
2
]eλ∆
2/2σ2
≤ e(∆2/2σ2)λ2+(∆2/2σ2)λ ,
for any λ ≥ 0. Substituting this into (29) with a choice of λ = σ2
k∆2
(
ε− k∆2
2σ2
)
, which is positive for
ε > k∆2/2σ2, we get
µk0(B)− eεµk1(B) ≤ exp
{
(k∆2/2σ2)λ2 + (k∆2/2σ2)λ− ελ+ λ log λ− (λ+ 1) log(λ+ 1)
}
≤ 1
1 + σ
2
k∆2
(
ε− k∆2
2σ2
) exp{− σ2
2k∆2
(
ε− k∆
2
2σ2
)2}
≤ 1
1 +
√
2σ2
k∆2
log(e+ 1δ
√
k∆2
σ2
)
1
e+ 1δ
√
k∆2
σ2
≤ 1√
k∆2
σ2
+
√
2 log(e+ (1/δ)
√
k∆2/σ2)
δ
eδ
√
σ2
k∆2
+ 1
,
for our choice of σ2 such that ε ≥ k∆2/(2σ2) +
√
(2k∆2/σ2) log(e+ (1/δ)
√
k∆2/σ2). The right-
hand side is always less than δ.
With σ2 ≥ (4k∆2/ε2) log(e+ (ε/δ)) and σ2 ≥ k∆2/(4ε), this ensures that the above condition
is satisfied. This implies that we only need σ2 = O((k∆2/ε2) log(e+ (ε/δ))).
C Analysis of the geometric mechanism in Theorem 4.4
Theorem 4.4 follows directly from the proof of Theorem 3.3, once the appropriate associations are
made. Consider two databases D0 and D1, and a single query q such that q(D1) = q(D0) + 1.
The geometric mechanism produces two random outputs q(D0) + Z and q(D1) + Z where Z is
distributed accruing to the geometric distribution. Let P0 and P1 denote the distributions of the
random output respectively. For x ≤ q(D0), P0(x) = eεP1(x), and for x > q(D0), eεP0(x) = P1(x).
Then, it is not difficult to see that the privacy region achieved by the geometric mechanism is equal
to the privacy region achieved by the canonical binary example of X˜0 and X˜1 in (17) and (18)
with δ = 0. This follows from the fact there is a stochastic transition from the pair X˜0 and X˜1
to q(D0) + Z and q(D1) + Z; further, the converse is also true. Hence, from the perspective of
hypothesis testing, those two (pairs of) outcomes are equivalent.
It now follows from the proof of Theorem 3.3 that the k-fold composition privacy region is
exactly the optimal privacy region described in (5) with δ = 0. We also know that this is the
largest possible privacy region achieved by a class of (ε, 0)-differentially private mechanisms.
C.1 Cut queries of a graph and variance queries of a matrix
Blocki et. al. [BBDS12] showed that classical Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform can be used to
produce a differentially private version of a database. Further, they show that this achieves the
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best tradeoff between privacy and utility for two applications: cut queries of a graph and variance
queries of a matrix. In this section, we show how the best known trade off can be further improved
by applying Theorem 3.4.
First, Blocki et. al. provide a differentially private mechanism for cut queries q(G,S): the
number of edges crossing a (S, S¯)-cut in a weighted undirected graph G. This mechanism produces
a sanitized graph satisfying (ε, δ)-differential privacy, where two graphs are neighbors if they only
differ on a single edge. The utility of the mechanism is measured via the additive error τ incurred
by the privatization. Precisely, a mechanism M is said to give a (η, τ, ν)-approximation for a single
cut query q(·, ·), if for every graph G and every nonempty S it holds that
P
(
(1− η) q(G,S)− τ ≤ M(G,S) ≤ (1 + η) q(G,S) + τ
)
≥ 1− ν . (30)
For the proposed Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism satisfying (ε, δ)-differential privacy, it is
shown that the additive error τ0 incurred by querying the database k times is bounded by [BBDS12,
Theorem 3.2]1
τ0 = O
(
|S|
√
log(1/δ) log(k/ν)
ε
log
( log(k/ν)
η2δ
))
. (31)
Compared to other state-of-the-art privacy mechanisms such as the Laplace noise adding mechanism
[Dwo06], Exponential mechanism [MT07], Multiplicative weights [HR10], and Iterative Database
Construction [GRU12], it is shown in [BBDS12] that the Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism achieves
the best tradeoff between the additive error τ0 and the privacy ε. This tradeoff in (31) is proved
using the existing Theorem 3.2. We can improve this analysis using the optimal composition
theorem of Theorem 3.4, which gives
τ = O
(
|S|
√
log(e+ ε/δ) log(k/ν)
ε
log
( log(k/ν)
η2δ
))
. (32)
This is smaller than (31) by (a square root of) a logarithmic factor when ε = Θ(δ). The proof of
the analysis in (32) is provided below.
A similar technique has been used in [BBDS12] to provide a differentially private mechanism for
variance queries v(A, x) = xTATAx: the variance of a given matrix in a direction x. The proposed
mechanism produces a sanitized covariance matrix that satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy, where two
matrices are neighbors if they differ only in a single row and the difference is by Euclidean distance
at most one. With the previous composition theorem in Theorem 3.2, the authors of [BBDS12]
get an error bound τ1 = O
(
log(1/δ) log(k/ν)
ε2η
log2
(
log(k/ν)
η2δ
))
. Using our tight composition theorem,
this can be improved as τ = O
(
log(e+ε/δ) log(k/ν)
ε2η
log2
(
log(k/ν)
η2δ
))
. Again, for ε = Θ(δ), this is an
improvement of a logarithmic factor.
For cut queries, Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism proceeds as follows:
1The original theorem is stated for a single query with k = 1. Here we state it more generally with arbitrary k.
This requires scaling ν by 1/k to take into account the union bound over k query outputs in the utility guarantee in
(30).
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Johnson-Lindenstrauss mechanism for cut queries [BBDS12]
Input: A n-node graph G, parameters ε, δ, η, ν > 0
Output: An approximate Laplacian of G: L˜
1: Set r = 8 log(2/ν)/ν2 and w =
√
32r log(2/δ) log(4r/δ)/ε
2: For every pair of nodes I 6= j, set new weights wi,j = w/n+ (1− w/n)wi,j
3: Randomly draw a matrix N of size r × (n2), whose entries are i.i.d. samples of N (0, 1)
4: Output L˜ = (1/r)ETGN
TNEG,
where EG is an
(
n
2
)× n matrix whose (i, j)-th row is √wi,j(ei − ej)
Here ei is the standard basis vector with one in the i-th entry. Given this synopsis of the sanitized
graph Laplacian, a cut query q(G,S) returns 1/(1− w/n)(1TS L˜1S − w|S|(n− |S|)/n), where 1S ∈
{0, 1}n is the indicator vector for the set S. If the matrix N is an identity matrix, this returns the
correct cut value of G.
We have the choice of w ∈ R and r ∈ Z to ensure that the resulting mechanism is (ε, δ)-
differentially private, and satisfy (η, τ, ν)-approximation guarantees of (30). We utilize the following
lemma from [BBDS12].
Lemma 1. With the choice of
w =
4
ε0
log(2/δ0) and r =
8 log(2/ν)
η2
,
each row of NEG satisfy (ε0, δ0)-differential privacy, and the resulting Johnson-Lindenstrauss mech-
anism satisfy (η, τ, ν)-approximation guarantee with
τ = 2|S| η w ,
where |S| is the size of the smaller partition S of the cut (S, S¯).
The error bound in (31) follows from choosing
ε0 =
ε√
4r log(2/δ)
and δ0 =
δ
2r
,
and applying Theorem 3.2 to ensure that the resulting mechanism with r-composition of the r rows
of MEG is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Here it is assumed that ε < 1.
Now, with Theorem 3.3, we do not require ε0 to be as small, which in turn allows us to add
smaller noise w, giving us an improved error bound on τ . Precisely, using Theorem 3.4 it follows
that a choice of
ε0 =
ε√
4r log(e+ 2ε/δ)
and δ0 =
δ
2r
,
suffices to ensure that after r-composition we get (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Resulting noise is
bounded by w ≤ 4√4r log(e+ 2ε/δ) log(4r/δ)/ε, which gives the error bound in (32). The proof
follows analogously for the matrix variance queries.
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D Proof of Theorem 5.1
To prove Theorem 5.1, it is sufficient to prove Theorem D.1 stating that that any other protocol
can be simulated from the randomized response outputs. Let {xi}i∈[k] denote the binary data
distributed among k parties. Let {x˜i}i∈[k] denote the outputs of the randomized response as per
Equation (16). We will prove that any protocol that obeys differential privacy conditions can
be simulated from x˜i’s. This proves the desired theorem, since the optimal protocol and the
optimal decision rules can be simulated by each node (and the central observer) upon receiving the
randomized responses. Hence, proving that randomized response is sufficient to achieve optimal
performance (on any metric).
Theorem D.1. For any protocol that generates a random transcript τ , there exists a stochastic
transformation T such that the joint distribution of the bits and the transcript can be simulated
from the randomized outputs:
(x1, . . . , xk, τ)
D
= (x1, . . . , xk, T (x˜1, . . . , x˜k)) , (33)
where
D
= denotes equality in distribution, and x˜i is a randomized response of xi.
To prove the above theorem, our strategy is to apply induction argument over a class of stochas-
tic transformations T` taking randomized responses x˜
`
1 = (x˜1, . . . , x˜`) as inputs together with the
original bits xk`+1 = (x`+1, . . . , xk). We will prove the following series of equations:
(x1, . . . , xk, τ)
D
= (x1, . . . , xk, T1(x˜1, x
k
2)) (34)
D
= (x1, . . . , xk, T2(x˜
2
1, x
k
3)) (35)
...
D
= (x1, . . . , xk, Tk(x˜
k
1)) , (36)
We first prove Equation (34). We show an equivalent version of this equation, which is (x1, τ)
D
=
(x1, T (x˜1, x
k
2)) for all fixed values of x
k
2. Equation (34) follows by applying Bayes rule to this
equation. First, note that for all fixed xk2,
R(τ, x1 = 0, x1 = 1) ⊆ R(ε1, δ1) , (37)
by the fact that τ is (ε1, δ1)-differentially private and Corollary 2.3. Next, notice that by construc-
tion, the randomized response achieves this outer bound, i.e.
R(x˜1, x1 = 0, x1 = 1) = R(ε1, δ1) , (38)
for all values of xk2 which holds only under the current assumption that x
k
1 are independent. Hence
from the reverse data processing inequality in Theorem 2.5, it follows that for each instance of
xk2, there exists a stochastic transformation such that τ is simulated from x˜1, i.e. (x1, τ)
D
=
(x1, T (x˜1, x
k
2)). This proves the desired Equation (34).
Now, we prove the induction step that starting from Equation (34) allows us to show recursively
Equations (35) and (36). We want to prove that there always exists a stochastic transformation
T`+1 such that
(xk1, T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1))
D
= (xk1, T`+1(x˜
`+1
1 , x
k
`+2)) , (39)
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for any stochastic transformation T` satisfying (ε`+1, δ`+1)-differential privacy. Again, we prove
that (x`+1, T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1))
D
= (x`+1, T`+1(x˜
`+1
1 , x
k
`+2)) for all values of (x
`
1, x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1). Then, Equation
(39) follows from Bayes rule. First note that from the assumption that T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1) is (ε`+1, δ`+1)-
differentially private with respect to x`+1, we know that for any fixed values of (x
`
1, x˜
`
1, x
k
`+2), binary
hypothesis testing on x`+1 based on the observation T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1) must obey the differential privacy
constraint:
P(T`(x˜`1, xk`+1) ∈ S|x`+1, x`1, x˜`1, xk`+2) ≤ eε`+1P(T`(x˜`1, xk`+1) ∈ S|x`+1, x`1, x˜`1, xk`+2) + δ`+1 ,(40)
and since T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1) is conditionally independent of x
`
1 given x˜
`
1, we get
P(T`(x˜`1, xk`+1) ∈ S|x`+1, x˜`1, xk`+2) ≤ eε`+1P(T`(x˜`1, xk`+1) ∈ S|x`+1, x˜`1, xk`+2) + δ`+1 . (41)
This implies that for each value of (x˜`1, x
k
`+2),
R(T`(x˜`1, xk`+1), x`+1 = 0, x`+1 = 1) ⊆ R(ε`+1, δ`+1) . (42)
Next, notice that by construction, the randomized response achieves this outer bound, i.e.
R(x˜`+1, x1 = 0, x1 = 1) = R(ε`+1, δ`+1) , (43)
for all values of (x˜`1, x
k
`+2) which holds only under the current assumption that x
k
1 are indepen-
dent. Hence from the reverse data processing inequality in Theorem 2.5, it follows that for each
instance of (x˜`1, x
k
`+2), there exists a stochastic transformation such that T` is simulated from x˜`+1,
i.e. (x`+1, T`(x˜
`
1, x
k
`+1))
D
= (x`+1, T`+1(x˜`+1, x˜
`
1, x
k
`+2)). This proves the desired induction step in
Equation (39). Consequently, by induction Equation (36) holds, and this proves desired Theorem
D.1.
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